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MUDDLING IN THE QUICKSANDS OF TRADITION AND 
CUSTOM AND SKATING DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPES OF 
MODERNITY: THE REFORM OF MARRIAGE AND 
INHERITANCE LAWS IN ZIMBABWE
Welshman Ncube
Associate Professor, Department of Private Law, University of Zimbabwe
INTRODUCTION
In 1993 the Government of Zimbabwe published a White Paper on Marriage and Inheritance 
in Zimbabwe which invited debate on proposed law reforms to this area of the law. That 
white paper generated widespread and often heated debate. I had occasion to participate 
in that debate and dismissed much of the White Paper's proposals for law reform as largely 
an exercise in "superfluity" and "mischief making".11 categorised some of the "proposals" 
as superfluous because those "proposals" were in fact already the law. I wondered how 
the law officers of the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs could have got 
so much of the present state of the law so completely wrong and hence some of their 
recommendations to reform the law to what it already was. The other proposed reforms, 
which were not superfluous I argued, were mischievous since they were apparently 
intended to facilitate either the conversion of monogamous civil marriages into potentially 
polygamous ones or were designed to allow the legal recognition of the co-existence of 
civil law and customary law widows.2
Those aspects of the White Paper's recommendations relating to inheritance issues, which 
were the only ones that were not superfluous, have now been incorporated into the 
provisions of the Administration of Estates Amendment Act No.6 of 1997, which came into 
force on 1 November, 1997. In terms of section 6 the provisions of the Amendment Act 
shall not affect the estate of any person who died before the date of its commencement.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate and analyse the new law as contained in the 
Administration of Estates Amendment Act within the context of existing law.
The Administration of Estates Amendment Act No.6 of 1997, ("the Administration of Estates 
Amendment Act") principally amends the Administration of Estates Act, [Cap 6:01] by 
repealing section 68 and then introducing a new Part IIIA comprising sections 68 through 
to 68K which provide a framework and substantive law principles for the administration 
and distribution of deceased estates which would otherwise be governed by customary 
law. It also amends the Deceased Estates Succession Act [Cap 6:02,] the Customary Marriages 
Act, [Cap 5:07] and the Deceased Persians Family Maintenance Act, [Cap 6:03]. Discussed 
below are each of the principal amendments being made to the laws of marriage, inheritance, 
maintenance and rules governing the choice of law.
1 SeeW. Ncube, "The White Paper on Marriage and Inheritance in Zimbabwe: An Exercise in Superfluity 
and Mischief?" Legal Forum [19931 Vol.5, No.4, at p.9.
2 For further and fuller discussions of some of the issues raised by the White Paper see also J. Stewart 
et al "Some points to ponder arising from the White Paper" Legal Forum [1993] Vol. 5, No. 2,1 and L. 
Madhuku, "Government White Paper Again: A Reply to a Reply", Legal Forum [1994] Vol.6, N o.2,20.
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THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
Before the Supreme Court judgement in Mujawo v Chogugudza,3 the deceased estates of all 
Africans regardless of whether they were married under customary law or general law 
were governed by customary law. This was because of the combined effects of the then 
section 69 (now 68) of the Administration of Estates Act, section 13 of the then African 
Marriages Act [Chapter 238] (now the Customary Marriages Act, [Cap 5:07]) and sections 
3 and 7 of the Customary Law (Application) Act (Cap 8:05]. These provisions, which placed 
the intestate devolution of the property of Africans under the regulation of customary law, 
are all being repealed by the Administration of Estates Amendment Act. Section 13 of the 
Customary Marriages Act (formerly the African Marriages Act, Cap 238) stated that 
notwithstanding that Africans had contracted a civil law marriage their property rights, 
including at death, would be governed by customary law. Hence it did not matter which 
type of Zimbabwean marriage Africans contracted, their property rights were always to 
be governed by customary law.4 However, Africans married in accordance with some foreign 
monogamous system of law had their property rights governed by the general law because 
section 13 was applicable only to African marriages contracted in terms of Zimbabwe's 
Marriage Act, [Cap 5:11].5
Section 68 of the Administration of Estates Act provided that:
If any African who has contracted a marriage according to African law or custom or 
who being unmarried, is the offspring of parents married according to African law 
and custom, dies intestate his estate shall be administered and distributed according 
to the customs and usages of the tribe or people to which he belonged.
The significance of this section lay in that the estates of Africans who had customary 
marriages or being unmarried were the offsprings of such marriages, would not only be 
distributed/inherited in accordance with customary law, but would be administered in 
terms of that system of law and thereby placing those estates outside the jurisdiction of the 
Master of the High Court who has jurisdiction to administer or rather supervise the 
administration of deceased estates in accordance with the general law.
Section 6A of the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act (later section 7 of the Customary 
Law (Application) Act, [Cap 8:05]) provided that the heir at customary law of any deceased 
person to whom customary law applied would succeed, in his individual capacity, to that 
deceased person's immovable property. The context of this section was that in a long line 
of cases the colonial courts had held that the ownership of immovable property was 
unknown at customary law and hence immovable property rights could not be regulated 
by customary law.6 Thus, it became necessary to enact section 6A to allow the heir at 
customary law to succeed to a deceased African's immovable property which would 
otherwise have had to devolve in accordance with the general law.
3 1992 (2) ZLR 321. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the estates of those Africans married in 
accordance with the general law are governed by the general law since section 13 of the Customary 
Marriages Act has been repealed by implication by the Legal Age of Majority Act No. 15 of 1981 as 
read with section 3 of the Customary Law (Application) Act.
4 See, for example, Jenah v Nyemba 1986 [11 ZLR 136 [SC] and W. Ncube, Family Law in Zimbabwe, LRF, 
Harare, 1989, at pp 189-193.
5 See Zvarewa v Zvarewa 1979 A AC 37.
6 See, for example, Dokotera v The Master and Others 1957R + N 697,Matambov Matambo 1969 (3)SA 717 
(RAD) and Cuzuzu v Chinamasa NO. HC-H-246-83.
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As already indicated the Administration of Estates Amendment Act repeals all these 
sections. Section 3 of the Amendment Act repeals section 68 of the Administration of Estates 
Act and substitutes in its place various provisions which we will discuss extensively later. 
Section 10(1) repeals the whole of the Customary Law (Application) Act including its section 
7 referred to above. Section 10(2) brings into operation Part II of the Customary Law and 
Local Courts Act, Cap 7:05 which had not been brought into effect in 1993 when the rest of 
that statute became operational. The effect of this is to render superfluous the provisions 
of the Customary Law (Application) Act and hence its repeal by section 6(1)7 Section 7 
formally repeals section 13 of the Customary Marriages Act, which as we have already 
indicated above was, in 1992, held by the Supreme Court in Mujawo v Chogugudza (supra) 
to have been repealed by implication by the Legal Age of Majority Act as read with section 
3 of the Customary Law (Application) Act (then section 3 of the Customary Law and Primary 
Courts Act).7 8
The net effect of all these amendments is that the choice of law for the determination of 
which law applies to the property rights of Africans whether married or unmarried will 
now be determined entirely by the choice of law rules in section 3 of the Customary Law 
and Local Courts Act.9
In fact, in respect of inheritance issues and for the avoidance of doubt, the Administration 
of Estates Amendment Act introduces a new section 68G which states that:
Section 3 of the Customary Law and Local Courts Act, [Chapter 7:05] shall apply in
determining the question of whether or not customary law applied to a deceased
person for purposes of this Part:
Provided that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that:
(a) customary law applied to a person who, at the date of his death, was married in 
accordance with customary law; and
(b) the general law of Zimbabwe applied to a person who, at the date of his death, 
was married in accordance with the Marriage Act [Chapter 5:11] or the law of a 
foreign country, even if he was also married to the same person under customary 
law.
This means no more than that the inheritance rights of those persons married under 
customary law shall be governed by customary law, while those married in terms of the 
general law whether under Zimbabwean law or some foreign law shall be governed by the 
general law. The provisions of Part IIIA of the Administration of Estates Act will apply 
only to those estates which would otherwise be governed by customary law and have not 
been disposed of by will because section 68 A provides that:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), this Part shall apply to the estate of any person to whom 
customary law applied at the date of his death.
(2) This part other than section 68C [dealing with succession to a deceased African's 
name and inheritance of symbolic traditional articles such as a deceased person's 
spear] shall not apply to any part of any estate that is disposed of by will.
7 The Customary Law (Application) Act was always a transitional Act, which preserved the operation 
of Part II of the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act pending the coming into force of the equivalent 
Part II of the Customary Law and Local Courts Act which repealed and replaced the former.
8 The Legal Age of Majority Act no longer exists as a separate statute as a result of the Law Revisor's 
revisions of the statutes of Zimbabwe in 1986 in terms of his powers under the Statute Law Compilation 
and Revision Act Cap 1:03. Its provisions have, however, survived totally intact as part of the General 
Law Amendments Act, Cap 8:07.
9 For a full discussion of how these rules operate see W. Ncube, Family Law in Zimbabwe, Chapter 1.
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The estates of all those persons to whom customary law applies which have not been 
disposed of by will, shall be administered and distributed in accordance with customary 
law and the provisions of Part III A of the Administration of Estates Act. Thus, an African, 
to whom customary law applies and who does not wish his estate to be distributed in 
accordance with the new principles, will have to make a will.
Section 68G (2) provides that in the event of there being a dispute among the beneficiaries 
of an estate, who are defined as the deceased's surviving spouse and children, as to whether 
or not customary law applied to the deceased person, the Master shall determine the dispute 
as speedily as he can. In terms of section 68J, should any of the parties be aggrieved by the 
decision of the Master, they have a right to appeal to the High Court.
APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTOR
Section 68B provides for the appointment of an executor to estates governed by customary 
law. Previously, such estates were administered in terms of customary law and there was 
no provision for the appointment of an executor. With this amendment, after the death of 
a person to whom customary law applies the "Master shall summon the deceased person's 
family, or such members of the family as are readily available, for the purpose of appointing 
a person to be the executor of the deceased person's estate".10 At such meeting the Master, 
with the concurrence of the relatives present, shall appoint any person to be the executor. 
If the relatives are unable to agree on a person to be appointed executor, the Master shall 
appoint the executor having regard to the order of ranking provided in section 26 which 
places the surviving spouse first, the next of kin second and creditors third. This simply 
means that where the members of the deceased's family agree on an executor, the Master 
shall appoint that person and where they are not agreed he shall appoint the surviving 
spouse or if she is not available, any of the next of kin interested and available and if none 
is available and willing any of the creditors willing and available. The heir at customary 
law is also eligible for appointment as executor, should the family prefer him.11 The executor 
so appointed shall be responsible for discharging the claims of creditors and "administering 
and safeguarding" the estate pending its distribution in terms of a plan to be prepared by 
the executor and approved by the Master.12
The term "Master" as used in connection with customary law estates is being extended in 
its meaning to include any class of magistrates or any other person designated by the 
Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs to be entitled to perform all or any of 
the functions of the Master.13 This means that it will now be possible, in relation to customary 
law estates, to decentralise the functions or some of the functions of the Master so that they 
may be performed at the local level by magistrates and assistant magistrates or even by 
Chiefs or other persons, if they are so designated by the Minister.
Note must also be made of the fact that the estate of a person governed by customary law 
will include that person's immovable property since the definition of "estate" in section 
68(1) makes it clear that it "includes any immovable property forming part of the estate". 
The necessity for this specific inclusion of immovable property arises from the reasons
10 Section 6813(1). It may be noted that under the original draft Bill the heir at customary law was to 
perform all the functions of an executor. That provision was only changed after the first reading of 
the Bill following massive protest and lobbying by Women's organisations and other critics.
11 Section 6813(3).
12 Section 6813(4).
13 See the definition of "Master" in section 68 (1) as read with section 681.
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discussed in the introduction, namely that the colonial courts held that as the ownership 
of immovable property was unknown at customary law it (the immovable property) could 
not be regulated by customary law.
THE OLD CUSTOMARY LAW OF INHERITANCE
According to the courts' customary law, which is extensively contradicted by the living 
customary law (the customary law practised by people in their daily lives),14 there is a 
single heir at customary law who is, in the case of a deceased man, his eldest male child15 
or failing male children, the eldest daughter,16 failing daughters, the eldest male grandson17 
or failing grandsons presumably, the eldest granddaughter or on the failure of 
grandchildren, the deceased's eldest brother.18 According to this customary law a widow 
can never be the heir to her husband's estate.19
The net result of this version of customary law has been the complete exclusion of women 
as wives, daughters, mothers and sisters from the inheritance process. This has caused 
serious problems for women, particularly widows who have often been disposed of property 
they would have accumulated jointly with their husbands during the subsistence of the 
marriage.20 The changes being effected by the Administration of Estates Amendment Act 
to the laws of inheritance are directed at mainly addressing the iniquities of the courts' 
version of customary law which excluded widows and daughters from inheriting from 
their husbands and fathers respectively.
RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGES
Zimbabwe is one of very few countries in Eastern and Southern Africa which requires the 
registration of customary law marriages before they can be fully recognised by the law as 
valid marriages. The provision requiring such registration was enacted by the colonial 
government and inherited at independence.21 To date it has remained intact except that by 
piecemeal legislative interventions and judicial interpretations, recognition of unregistered 
customary marriages has been extended to more and more areas of the law.22 The 
Administration of Estates Amendment Act extends further recognition to unregistered
14 For a presentation of some of the evidence of this living customary law, see K. Dengu-Zvobgo, B. 
Donzwa, E. Gwaunza, J. Kazembe, W. Ncube and J. Stewart, Inheritance in Zimbabwe: Law, Customs 
and Practices, Sapes Trust, Harare, 1994 hereinafter cited as K. Dengu-Zvobgo et al.
15 See Duma v Madidi 1918 SR 559 and Jamu v Jim Takaziweyi 1939 SRN 49.
16 See Mangwende v Chihowa 1987 (1) ZLR 228 (SC).
17 See note 6 above.
18 Ibid.
19 Murisa v Murisa 1992 (1) ZLR 167 (SC).
20 See generally K. Dengu-Zvobgo et al Inheritance in Zimbabwe: Law, Custom and Practices, Sapes Trust, 
Harare, 1994.
21 This is section 3(1) of the Customary Marriages Act. However, even the colonial state did give partial 
recognition to unregistered customary marriages in the interests of the children and hence subsection 
5 of section 3 extended recognition for the "purposes of customary law and custom relating to the 
status, guardianship, custody and rights of succession of the children of such marriage ...". For a 
fuller discussion of how the colonial and post colonial courts have interpreted this provision see W. 
Ncube, "Magic and Mysticism as Aids to Statutory Interpretation: The Case of Judicial Recognition 
of Customary Unions in Zimbabwe" ZLRev 1995 Vol.12.
22 See Carmichael v Moyo 1994 (2) ZLR 176 (SC), Zimnat Insurance Co. v Chawanda 1990 (2) ZLR 143 (SC) 
and W. Ncube, note 21 above.
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custom ary m arriages for purposes of inheritance. The new section 68(3) of the 
Administration of Estates Act reads:
A marriage contracted according to customary law shall be regarded as a valid marriage 
for the purposes of this Part notwithstanding that it has not been solemnized in terms 
of the Customary Marriages Act [Chapter 5 :0 7 ] ,. .  .
This means that for purposes of the new inheritance principles and rules introduced by the 
Amendment Act, a customary law union will be treated as if it were a fully valid marriage. 
Where the husband had only one wife this presents no problems (other than those of proof). 
It also presents very few problems where the husband had two or more wives all of whom 
were associated with him in customary unions. Serious problems begin where the husband 
had married one or more of the wives in a registered marriage and one or more in 
unregistered customary unions. For example, as often happens in Zimbabwe, the husband 
may have a registered customary marriage with one wife and "secretly" (often with the 
knowledge of his family but without the knowledge of his wife) contracts a customary 
union with another woman with whom he proceeds to have children. In such situations 
the first wife often discovers the existence of the other woman at the time of the husband's 
death or soon thereafter. Under the new rules of recognition the two widows in this example, 
together with all their children would have to share the estate as discussed below. The 
justice and desirability of this approach is at best doubtful. The difficulties are caused by 
the fact that many men continuously mix customary practices and values with Western 
values. In a true traditional setting it was impossible for a man to have a secret customary 
marriage and father children without the knowledge of his first wife. The issue of taking a 
second and subsequent wives was a family matter which involved the sitting wife or wives 
who had to consent to the marriage. There were traditional ways of securing this consent. 
The husband could give a reluctant sitting wife cows, for example, to sweeten her to the 
idea. The important point, though, is that it was not possible for a woman to discover that 
she was in a polygynous marriage only after the death of her husband. Today, this happens 
quite frequently, particularly in urban areas.
This mix of tradition and modernity goes even further. A man may marry the first wife in 
accordance with the general law in terms of the Marriage Act, [Cap 5:11] which prohibits 
polygamy, and thereafter enter into an unregistered customary union with another woman. 
Fortunately, recognition has not been extended to this type of customary union by the 
Administration of Estates Amendment Act. In this situation the customary union entered 
into by a man already married in a monogamous marriage is treated as a legal nullity, even 
for purposes of inheritance in so far as the "widow" in the customary union is concerned.23
This is due to the proviso to subsection 3 of section 68 quoted above which proviso states:
Provided that such a marriage [unregistered customary marriage] shall not be regarded 
as valid for the purposes of this Part if, when it was contracted, either of the parties 
was married to someone else in accordance with the Marriage Act [Chapter 5:11 ] or 
the law of a foreign country under which persons are not permitted to have more 
than one spouse.
23 The children in such a union should be in the same position as all the other children since it appears 
that both customary law (at least as applied by the courts) and the Amendment Act do not make a 
distinction between "illegitimate" and "legitimate" children. The Amendment Act, although it does 
not define child, defines "beneficiary" as any child of the deceased person and proceeds to use the 
word child in its various provisions in a manner which does not suggest that the reference is to 
legitimate children only.
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This effectively means a customary law union cannot, in law, co-exist with a monogamous 
marriage where it was preceded by that monogamous marriage.
However, for purposes of inheritance, a customary law union can legally co-exist with a 
monogamous marriage which was contracted after the customary law union because the 
provisions of the new subsection 4 of section 68 state that:
(4) A marriage contracted according to the Marriage Act [Chapter 5:11] or the law of a 
foreign country under which persons are not permitted to have more than one spouse 
shall be regarded as a valid marriage for the purposes of this Part even if, when it was 
contracted, either of the parties was married to someone else in accordance with 
customary law, whether or not that customary law marriage was solemnized in terms 
of the Customary Marriages Act [Chapter 5:07].24
This particular problem arises mainly because of the government's inability or reluctance 
to take a firm and decisive legislative decision on the recognition or non-recognition of 
customary law unions. The approach taken is not only often confusing, but it is as if the 
government wants to have its cake and eat it too. Section 3(1) of the Customary Marriages 
Act provides that an unregistered customary law marriage shall be invalid. If the marriage 
is invalid it follows that any of the parties can terminate the "social" relationship at anytime 
and marry another person. It is because of this unlimited capacity to marry anybody else 
enjoyed by persons associated with each other in a customary union that makes it possible 
for a person in a customary union to contract a monogamous marriage at anytime with 
another person. To say the unregistered customary marriage is invalid must and does mean 
that either of the parties is free, at anytime, to contract a valid monogamous marriage with 
any other person. To then say in the same breadth that, if one of such persons does contract 
a monogamous marriage, that marriage shall be treated as a polygamous marriage for 
purposes of inheritance is surely attempting to have and eat one's cake at the same time. 
The state has to make a choice; either to give full recognition to unregistered customary 
marriages as do many of the countries in the region; or to treat it as an invalid marriage, at 
least as between the parties, and live with all the consequences of that invalidity. To muddle, 
huff and puff over the issue without making a clear choice is not only complicating the law 
unnecessarily, but in the long run, it will cause more hardship to those intended to receive 
the law's protection. A person who contracts a monogamous marriage with a person whom 
the law recognises to be competent to do so, surely has a right to expect the law to 
consistently recognise the monogamous nature of that marriage. It is neither realistic nor 
fair for the law to tell her or him after the death of her or his spouse that, although she/he 
had a monogamous marriage, for purposes of inheritance she/he would be treated as if 
she/he was in a polygynous relationship.
Let us explain for a moment the meaning of section 68(4) as quoted above. It means that 
where, for example, a man who has a customary law union marries another woman 
monogamously, that monogamous marriage shall be treated as a polygynous marriage at
24 The original version of this provision or subsection as presented to Parliament during its first reading 
simply invalidated a monogamous civil law marriage contracted by a person who was, at the time of 
the contracting of the monogamous marriage, married to another person in terms of customary law, 
including a customary law union. The provision was then changed to its present form after heavy 
protests and lobbying from women's organisations. Had the clearly ridiculous original version gone 
through Parliament, it would have meant that a validly married person for all other purposes would 
have been treated as unmarried for purposes of inheritance and therefore not entitled to inherit 
anything from his wife or husband's estate. However, he would still have been able to claim 
maintenance under the provisions of the Deceased Persons Family Maintenance Act, [Cap 6:03].
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the time of his death for purposes of the inheritance rights of the parties.25 This means that 
the monogamously married wife would have to share the estate with the other wife or 
wives. What is worse, as we will see later, is that the first wife, who in this case would be 
the customary law union wife, would get a bigger share of the portion of the estate set 
aside for the surviving spouses.
The problem with this aspect of the provision is the difficulty of determining when a 
customary union can be considered dissolved. In justifying this approach the Minister of 
Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs used an example which was not only simplistic 
but also designed to appeal to the emotions of Parliamentarians and others. This example 
was intended to justify why it was necessary to recognise the civil marriage as a polygamous 
one for purposes of inheritance. The Minister said there are many cases where a man marries, 
in an unregistered union, a woman who resides in the rural areas, establishes a home with 
her there, and leaves her to farm and look after the children at that rural home. After 
several years of such unregistered marriage, say 20 years or more, the husband while 
working in town meets a young woman who persuades him to marry her in a monogamous 
marriage. They enter into a monogamous marriage and establish a home in town. The first 
wife remains in the rural home as before. The husband occasionally goes there as before. 
Should she, the Minister rhetorically asked, lose the right to inherit from the husband 
upon his death? Essentially, therefore, the argument was that the rural widow in this 
hypothetical case should have a right to inherit from her husband. If all was as simple as 
suggested by the hypothetical case few difficult questions would arise. Unfortunately, the 
hypothetical scenario is only but a small example of the situations covered by the provision.
What of the situation where the husband, even though customarily married at the time of 
his monogamous marriage, had taken clear steps to bring the customary union relationship 
to an end after his monogamous marriage? Let us say in the same hypothetical case, after 
monogamously marrying the young woman the husband removes the rural wife and 
formally takes her to her natal home. After several years or even a few months, he dies. 
Read literally the provision suggests that the first wife would still be regarded as the 
deceased's widow and would inherit from him together with the monogamously married 
widow.
What of the hypothetical situation where, without following traditional "divorce" 
procedures (whatever they may be) the husband and the wife simply separate or the 
husband desserts their common home and goes on, after several years, to monogamously 
marry another woman? Would it be considered that the customary union would have 
been terminated by the separation or would it be considered that the customary union was 
still in existence at the time of the man's marriage as he would not have complied with 
traditional divorce procedures? In any event, why should traditional divorce procedures 
be relevant at all considering the fact that the parties are not lawfully married to each other 
and therefore cannot divorce each other?26 Assuming that in the light of this new law 
customarily married couples have now tcf follow the traditional divorce procedures, what 
are those procedures? They seem to vary quite considerably from ethnic group to ethnic 
group and indeed from family to family. Among some groups the man who is "rejecting" 
his wife must give her a token coin and that's it. In others not only must he give the token 
coin, but he must physically deliver her to her natal family. In still other groups the two
25 For all other purposes, such as pension rights, insurance rights and burial the marriage will obviously 
remain a monogamous one.
26 See generally Joseph Tinga v Joshua Shcke.de 1970 A AC 30 and W. Ncube, note 4 above, at pp. 134-135.
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families must meet, discuss and agree on the "divorce". In some of these groups the giving 
of token coins is irrelevant. Further still, in other families, particularly among the Ndebele, 
there are no coins given to the wife at all. Divorce can be achieved or effected simply by 
expelling the wife from the matrimonial home or delivering her to her aunt. In these 
circumstances how can anyone reasonably know whether the person he or she is marrying 
has validly terminated the customary union?27
The above difficulties pale into insignificance against the fact that as formulated section 
68(4) and its proviso also mean that a person who has a registered customary marriage can 
enter into a clearly bigamous civil and monogamous marriage with another person and 
that bigamous marriage will be treated as if it were a customary marriage for purposes of 
inheritance. Literally, that is the meaning of the section, otherwise the words "whether or 
not that customary law marriage was solemnized in terms of the Customary Marriages 
A c t . . ." would be superfluous and meaningless.28 Until this amendment, it was always 
clear that a person who has contracted a registered customary marriage suffers from absolute 
incompetency to marry another person under a monogamous system of law.29 Even though 
the words used are clear and unambiguous, it is doubtful that the Legislature infact intended 
this result. As already indicated, the original formulation of subsection 4 when introduced 
in Parliament simply invalidated a civil law marriage for purposes of inheritance if it was 
contracted when one or other of the parties was married to another person in a customary 
law union. That provision read:
A marriage contracted according to the Marriage Act [Chapter 5:11] or the law of a 
foreign country under which persons are not permitted to have more than one spouse 
shall not be regarded as a valid marriage for purposes of this Part if, when it was 
contracted, either of the parties was married to someone else in accordance with 
customary law, whether or not that customary law marriage was solemnized in terms 
of the Customary Marriages Act [Chapter 5:07]. [my emphasis].
After women's organisations protested against this clause they reached a compromise with 
the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs which would have the law recognise, 
for purposes of inheritance, both the preceding customary union and the subsequent civil 
marriage. Instead of completely redrafting the provision to reflect this agreement, the 
Minister's Law Officers took the apparently easier approach of simply deleting the word 
"not" highlighted above in the quotation and inserting the word "even" after the word 
"Part". The effect of this easy approach was to achieve a meaning which could not have 
been intended, namely to give recognition to a bigamous civil law marriage contracted at 
a time when one of the persons was validly married under a registered customary marriage.
27 This problem will also particularly affect issues relating to a claim for adultery damages by a husband 
associated with a woman in a customary union, following the Supreme Court ruling in Carmichael v 
Moyo (supra) which extended recognition to customary unions for purposes of the husband's right to 
claim adultery damages against the lover of his "wife". For a fuller discussion of this issue see W. 
Ncube, note 21 above and W. Ncube, note 2 above.
28 Paraphrased for this issue and to demonstrate this point subsection 4 would read in part "A marriage 
contracted according to the Marriage A ct... shall be regarded as a valid marriage for the purposes of 
this Part, even if when it was contracted, either of the parties was married to someone else in accordance 
with customary law, whether or not that customary law marriage was solemnized in terms of the 
Customary Marriages A ct. . .  Provided that, for the purposes of this Part, the first-mentioned marriage 
shall be regarded as a customary law marriage".
29 See generally W. Ncube, note 3 above at p. 137-139.
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DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND THE NEW INHERITANCE LAW
Once the executor has discharged or settled all the claims against the estate of the deceased 
person he is required to draw up a distribution plan for the net residue of the estate.30 The 
distribution plan, which may deal with the conservation and application of the net estate 
for the benefit of the beneficiaries, the distribution of all or any part of the estate to the 
beneficiaries; the sale or disposal of any property in the net estate for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries; and the maintenance of any beneficiary;31 must be submitted to the Master 
by the executor for approval.32 Before approving the distribution plan, the Master is required 
to take such reasonable steps as are necessary to satisfy himself that, in drawing up the 
plan, the executor consulted all the members of the deceased's family and the beneficiaries 
and that the beneficiaries have agreed to the distribution plan in full knowledge and 
understanding of their rights.33 Where any member of the deceased's family or beneficiary 
has not been consulted the Master is required to decline to approve the executor's 
distribution plan until the consultation has been made and in the case of a beneficiary that 
beneficiary has also agreed to the distribution plan.34
The effect of these provisions is that while the executor has to consult the members of the 
deceased's family he need not obtain their agreement to the distribution plan, whereas in 
respect of the beneficiaries (the surviving spouse and/or children) he/she must not only 
consult them but must also obtain their consent or agreement to the plan in the full 
knowledge of their rights as heirs of the deceased. Thus the executor has a duty to explain 
what each beneficiary is entitled to in terms of the Act.
There is the problem of who the executor should consider to be a member of the deceased's 
family. The definition of family provided in section 68(1) is unhelpful. It simply states that 
"family, in relation to a deceased person . . .  means the persons who are recognized under 
customary law as constituting the deceased person's family". This means we are back to 
the unwritten customary law with all its flexibility, malleability and negotiability as to 
what is or is not a family and who is or is not a member of a particular family. As has been 
demonstrated elsewhere,35 at customary law, membership of a family is highly flexible 
and negotiable depending on who is asking and on the purpose for which the family is 
being defined. For example, in Ndebele custom the membership of a family for purposes 
of inheritance is called abosendo (family council) and includes the deceased's parents, 
paternal and maternal uncles and aunts, brothers and sisters, the surviving spouse, children 
and cousins. The absence of any one or even more members of abosendo docs not affect the
30 Section 68 D.
31 Note that the distribution can only be to a beneficiary and that the disposal of any property can only 
be for the benefit of a beneficiary. Similarly, maintenance arrangements can only be for a beneficiary. 
A beneficiary is defined as "a surviving spouse or child of the deceased person; or where the deceased 
person left no surviving spouse or child, any person who is entitled to inherit any property in the 
estate in terms of this part" (section 68(1 )(a) and (b)). The effect of this is that the distribution plan can 
only benefit the surviving spouse and/or children except where the deceased is not survived by any 
spouse or child, in which case the other relatives who are entitled to inherit in terms of the Act, 
namely parents, brothers and sisters of the deceased, must inherit in terms of whatever distribution 
plan is drawn up by the executor.
32 See section 68E(1) as read with section 68D(1).
33 Section 68E(2) as read with 68D(2)(b). The later section states that when drawing up a distribution 
plan the executor shall "... consult the deceased person's family and the beneficiaries and endeavour 
to obtain the beneficiaries' agreement to it".
34 Section 68E(3)(b).
35 See generally VV. Ncube, ct al, Continuity and Change: The f amily in Zimbabwe, WLSA, 1997, Harare.
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validity of the decisions that may be made on the inheritance issues.3* In other words, 
there are no permanently fixed persons who are defined as members of a deceased person's 
family for purposes of inheritance in all cases.
Notwithstanding these difficulties it could be said that the executor ought to consult the 
deceased's parents, brothers, sisters, uncles and aunts, at least in Ndebele custom. Legally, 
all that the executor needs do is consult them and seriously consider their representations 
and views on the distribution plan. It appears that, as long as they have been consulted, 
they have no further rights and hence would have no remedy against an executor who has 
drawn up a distribution plan with which they are not in agreement. However, a beneficiary 
has a remedy against any executor who draws up a plan with which he/sh e is in 
disagreement. Section 68E(3)(c) provides that where a beneficiary has not agreed to a plan 
submitted to the Master for approval, the Master shall "proceed to determine, in accordance 
with section 68F, any issues in dispute between the executor and the beneficiary or 
beneficiaries, and shall direct the executor to distribute or administer the estate in accordance 
with his determination".
This means that beneficiaries are entitled to insist that the estate be distributed in accordance 
with the formula or rules contained in section 68E and where there is a deviation they may 
decline to give their agreement to the distribution plan thereby necessitating the Master's 
intervention, who in turn is required to resolve the dispute in accordance with the formula 
in section 68E. In practice, these provisions are likely to ensure that the principles in section 
68E are adhered to strictly as if they arc rigid and inflexible and yet it is clear from section 
68D(2)(a) that they are intended to be flexible. Section 68D(2)(a) provides that when drawing 
up a distribution plan the executor shall:
pay due regard to the principles set out in subsection (2) of section 68F to the extent
that they are applicable.
If the principles were intended to be rigidly adhered to this section would have required 
the executor, not to "pay due regard to" but to comply with them.
Where the Master is satisfied that the distribution plan placed before him has been agreed 
to by all the beneficiaries he shall approve the plan and "authorize the executor to distribute 
or administer the estate in accordance" with that plan.36 7 Clearly, it is always best for an 
executor to submit a plan which has received the consent of the beneficiaries or at least 
which complies with the principles or guidelines set out in section 68F(2) which are 
discussed next hereunder.
THE DISTRIBUTION PRINCIPLES/FORMULA
As earlier indicated the deceased's heir at customary law will succeed to the deceased's 
name and tsvimbo (in Shona) or intonga or more appropriately umkhonto (in Ndebele), which 
items symbolize the deceased's name and position in the family.38 In traditional families, 
the heir stands at the head of the deceased's grave during the burial ceremony, while holding 
the deceased's tsvimbo or umkhonto (spear). This symbolises that he has stepped into the 
shoes of the deceased in the family organisation and in that way has assumed headship of 
the deceased's family.39 The customary law heir also inherits all such traditional articles
36 See generally K. Dengu-Zvobgo et at, above 14 above.
37 Section 68E(3)(a).
38 Section 68C.
39 See generally K. Dengu-Zvobgo et at op cit note 14.
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which at customary law pass to him upon the death of the deceased.40 Also devolving in 
accordance with customary law are any personal articles which, under customary law, 
devolve upon a member of the deceased person's family. Such articles are inherited by the 
member who is entitled to receive them at customary law and their value is excluded from 
the net estate which forms the subject matter of the executor's distribution plan.41 In general 
this means that, for example, the deceased's personal clothing or his traditional weapons 
and tools, are to be distributed in accordance with each family's customs and practices.
MONOGAMOUS CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES
Even though all customary marriages are potentially polygamous the great majority of 
them remain monogamous in practice until their dissolution by divorce or death. In the 
event of their dissolution by the death of the man section 68F(2)(d) provides that:
(d) where the deceased person is survived by one spouse and one or more children,
the surviving spouse should get —
(i) ownership of or, if that is impracticable, a usufruct over, the house
in which the spouse lived at the time of the deceased person's death, together 
with all the household goods; and
(ii) a share in the remainder of the net estate determined in accordance with the 
Deceased Estates Succession Act [Chapter 6:02],
It is clear from this provision that a surviving spouse in a monogamous customary marriage 
is entitled to inherit the matrimonial home and the household goods in that house. However, 
the formulation of this provision raises several difficulties. Firstly, it appears that the 
surviving spouse will be entitled to the matrimonial house only if she resided in it at the 
time of the deceased's death. What if the parties lived in rented accommodation while 
leasing out the deceased's house or their house? What if the deceased died while the parties 
were living apart and the deceased occupied the matrimonial home while the surviving 
spouse lived elsewhere? What about the situation where a surviving wife may have been 
residing in a rural communal or resettlement area while the deceased husband lived in the 
parties' urban house where he might have been working? What if, at the time of the death, 
the parties resided abroad where they could have been working and renting accommodation 
while the matrimonial home in Zimbabwe was rented or for that matter vacant?
It is difficult to understand what the rationale for formulating this provision in this manner 
was. It should simply have been formulated without reference to whether or not the 
surviving spouse resided in the matrimonial home or house at the time of the death of the 
deceased.
Secondly, what is meant by the term "house" as used, not only in this particular provision, 
but in others discussed later? In an urban area it is clear that the term house will include 
the matrimonial home as a unit and a whole. But what if the parties lived in and owned a 
commercial farm? Is the intention that the'surviving spouse will inherit only the house in 
which she lived and not the farm itself? Considering that the matrimonial house on a farm 
is indivisible from the rest of the farm is it intended that this should be one of those situations 
where it is impracticable for the surviving spouse to get ownership of the house and hence
40 Section 68C. Section 68C applies to all African estates, including testate ones, which would otherwise 
be governed by customary law. Only those estates of Africans governed by the general law are excluded 
from the application of the provisions of section 68C which requires that the heir at customary law 
inherits the deceased's name and traditional symbolic items such as the spear.
41 Section 68F(2)(a).
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will be entitled to a usufruct over only the house and not the rest of the farm? The 
formulation suggests that this is the intention. If so, then the new law hardly advances the 
rights of surviving spouses, particularly widows, who may be residing in commercial 
farming areas.
What of communal and resettlement areas where clearly the state owns the land and the 
occupants only have use rights? Clearly, these are some of the situations where it is 
impracticable for the surviving spouse to receive or get ownership of the house as the land 
does not belong to the deceased. The surviving spouse would get a usufruct over the house. 
But, even in communal and resettlement areas, the question of what is meant by house is 
ambiguous. In communal and resettlement areas the family would normally have several 
huts or small houses or a large house with huts or other smaller houses. Very rarely does 
one find a home with just a house as is the case in urban areas. How then is the provision 
(section 68F(2)(d) to be interpreted? In the context of communal and resettlement areas 
should the term "house" be read to mean the homestead together with the agricultural 
fields? Or should it be read to include only the homestead? Or still read more narrowly to 
mean only the particular house or hut the surviving spouse occupied? A more sensible 
approach would be that the intention of the Legislature was to ensure that the surviving 
spouse should remain at the matrimonial home as before and that therefore the usufruct 
over the "house" extends to the homestead together with the fields. However, this approach 
is not consistent with the ordinary grammatical meaning of the term "house".
That this provision and others, in so far as they use the term "house", raise more questions 
that others is obvious. It remains to be seen how the courts will deal with all the questions 
which arise.
In addition to the "house", and its household contents the surviving spouse is also entitled 
to receive a child's share or $200 000,00 whichever is the greater, from the remaining free 
residue of the estate. A child's share or $200 000,00 is the share fixed by the Deceased 
Estates Succession Act referred to in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (d) of subsection (2) of 
section 68F quoted above as read with regulations made thereunder.42 Basically, this means 
that the inheritance principles in monogamous customary marriages are now substantially 
similar to those under the general law except that under the general law the surviving 
spouse gets all the household goods and effects (which includes the family car), regardless 
of whether or not those goods are in the matrimonial house.43
The Administration of Estates Amendment Act also amends the Deceased Estates Succession 
Act by inserting a new section 3A which reads:
The surviving spouse of every person who on or after the date of commencement of 
the Administration of Estates Amendment Act, 1997, dies wholly or partly intestate 
shall be entitled to receive from the free residue of the estate —
a) the house or other domestic premises in which the spouses or the surviving spouse, 
as the case may be, lived immodiately before the person's death; and
b) the household goods and effects which, immediately before the person's death, 
were used in relation to the house or domestic premises referred to in paragraph
(a); where such house, premises, goods and effects form part of the deceased 
person's estate.
42 For an explanation of how this determination is made and generally for a fuller discussion of the 
provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act, see K. Dengu-Zvobgo et al, above, note 14 at pp. 
56-59.
43 See section 3(a)(i) which speaks of "the household goods and effects in such estate" and not of 
"household goods in that house" as does the Administration of Estates Act.
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It is difficult to understand why it was felt necessary to include paragraph (b) since section 
3(a)(i) and (b)(i) of the Deceased Estates Succession Act already allowed the surviving 
spouse to inherit the household goods and effects in the estate. There seems to be no point 
in further providing that such spouse shall be entitled to the household goods and effects 
which were used in connection with the matrimonial home as such goods are already 
included in the wider formulation of "household goods and effects in such estate" already 
provided for in the above referred paragraphs (a)(i) and (b)(i) of section 3 of the Act. In the 
circumstances, what is really new is the aspect of the provision allowing the surviving 
spouse to inherit the matrimonial home.44 The old provisions, namely section 3 of the 
Deceased Estates Succession Act, only guaranteed the surviving spouse the household 
goods and effects, although she/he could indirectly be guaranteed the matrimonial home 
if the remaining free residue of the estate constituted only a matrimonial home whose 
value did not exceed her/his guaranteed minimum share of $200 000,00.
In respect of monogamous customary law marriages, it remains to discuss the situation 
where the deceased person is not survived by any child but by a spouse. In that event the 
surviving spouse should get "ownership of or, if that is impracticable, a usufruct over, the 
house in which the spouse lived at the time of the deceased person's death, together with 
all the household goods in that house" and half of the remainder of the net estate.45 The 
balance of the net estate (that is the remaining half of the remainder) devolves upon the 
deceased person's surviving parents, brothers and sisters in equal shares.46 These principles 
are fundamentally the same as those which apply to general law estates where, in the 
absence of the deceased's descendants, the surviving spouse inherits the matrimonial home, 
the household goods and effects and a 50% share in the remaining balance with the surviving 
parents, brothers and sisters shading equally the other 50% share.47
ESTATES OF UNMARRIED, DIVORCED AND WIDOWED PERSONS
A single or divorced or widowed deceased person may be survived by a child or children 
only or by a child or children and parents or by parents only or by parents, brothers and 
sisters. Where the deceased person was unmarried, divorced or widowed and is not 
survived by any child his or her estate simply devolves upon his/her "surviving parents, 
brothers and sisters, if any, in equal shares."48 Where, however, the unmarried, divorced or 
widowed deceased person is survived by a child or children his/her estate devolves upon
44 In K. Dengu-Zvobgo el al, note 14 above, we in fact recommended that a surviving spouse be 
guaranteed retention of the matrimonial home regardless of the type of marriage. The Amendment 
Act effectively adopts our recommendation in that study. Indeed, the idea of a usufruct, where it is 
impracticable for the surviving spouse to inherit the matrimonial home, such as in communal and 
resettlement areas, was one other recommendation we made in that study, which has been 
implemented by the Administration of Estates Amendment Act. See at pp. 294-298 for a summary of 
the recommendations we made in that study and also pp. 274-301 for the arguments underpinning 
those recommendations and in particular for the surviving spouses's absolute need to remain in 
occupation of the matrimonial home and also to retain the household goods and effects.
45 Section 68F(2)(g)(i).
46 Section 68(2)(g)(ii).
47 See section 3(c) of the Deceased Estates Succession Act.
48 Section 68F(2((f). At general law where there are no descendants, the parents of the deceased take a 
half share of the estate each or failing either or both parents, the siblings of the deceased take through 
the parent through whom they are related to the deceased. See generally J. Stewart, "Who gets the 
Money? Some Aspects of Testa tc a nd In testate Succession in Zimba bwe", 1989-90 Zimbabwe Law Review, 
Vol.7-8, 85.
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that child or those children in equal shares, and "any of their descendants per stirpes".49 It 
may be noted that the later situation is no more than an incorporation of the Roman-Dutch 
common law principles50 into customary law estates. As a result, the devolution of 
customary law estates of unmarried persons who are survived by children is now the 
same regardless of whether the general law or customary law is applicable to the estate 
since Roman-Dutch common law principles have been superimposed on customary law 
estates.
POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
Elsewhere we strongly argued against the law's continued recognition of polygyny and 
recommended that, on a prescribed future date, recognition be withdrawn from all future 
polygynous marriages. This, we argued, would make it easier to formulate a sensible, 
logical and consistent law of inheritance for the country. The complexities brought upon 
the law of inheritance by the law's continued recognition of polygyny is well illustrated by 
the muddle and confusion of the new provisions dealing with polygynous situations. The 
only uncomplicated situation is where one of the wives in a polygynous marriage dies. In 
that event, the new law as contained in section 68F(2)(e) provides that if the deceased wife 
is survived by her husband and one or more children one-third of her estate should devolve 
upon her husband and the balance should devolve upon her own child or children in 
equal shares, as the case may be, and where any of the children have predeceased their 
deceased mother, their descendants per stirpes51
WHERE TflE DECEASED IS THE MAN
If a man who has a polygynous marriage dies intestate his property is shared among his 
surviving wives and his children. The actual provisions, namely section 68F(2)(b) and (c) 
setting out the sharing principles are extremely muddled, confused and border on the 
meaningless mainly because of clumsy and poor drafting. They read:
(2)(b) where the deceased person was a man and is survived by two or more wives
and had one or more children —
(i) one-third of the net estate should be divided between the surviving wives in 
the proportions two shares to the first wife and one share to the other wife or 
each of the other wives, as the case may be; and
(ii) the remainder of the estate should devolve upon —
(a) , his child; or
(b) . his children in equal shares; as the case m aybe, and any of their descendants per
stirpes;
(c) where the deceased person was a man and is survived by two or more wives, 
whether or not there are any surviving children, the wives should receive the 
following property, in addition to anything they are entitled to under paragraph  
(b) —
(i) where they live in separate houses, each wife should get ownership of or, if 
that is impracticable, a usufruct over, the house she lived in at the time of 
the deceased person's death, together with all the household goods in that 
house;
49 Section 68F(2)(h).
50 See generally J. Stewart, note 48 above and K. Dengu-Zvobgo et al note 14 above at pp. 56-59.
51 By representing through the branches of the deceased's family tree.
16 Welshman N cube
(ii) where the wives lived together in one house at the time of the deceased 
person's death, they should get joint ownership of or, if that is impracticable, 
a joint usufruct over the house and the household goods in that house".
The fundamental problem with paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection is that 
grammatically and logically they are very difficult to interpret. Paragraph (b) suggests 
that in a polygynous situation the surviving wives will share among themselves one-third 
of the net estate and the remaining two-thirds should devolve upon the deceased man's 
children. If that was all, there would be no difficulty. However, paragraph (c) goes on to 
give an entitlement to the surviving spouses to inherit the houses they occupied together 
with the household goods therein. But then a literal and grammatical application of the 
provisions of paragraph (b) would have exhausted all the net estate and there would be 
nothing left to devolve in terms of the provisions of paragraph (c) as one-third of the estate 
would have gone to the wives and another two-thirds to the children. And yet paragraph 
(c) says that "in addition t<ianything" the wives are entitled to under paragraph (b) they 
should get the houses they occupied and their contents. How does one share one-third and 
then two-thirds of the net estate and still remain with "houses" and "household goods" to 
distribute to the wives? Clearly, this is impossible. However, inspite of the difficulties 
involved in terms of the rules of statutory interpretation some sensible meaning has to be 
found and given to the provisions even where they are very badly drafted, since the 
Legislature must have intended them to mean something when read together. Even though 
this does violence to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used and the style of 
their presentation, it is submitted that the intention of the Legislature was the following:
a) that where a polygamist is survived by two or more wives whether or not he is also 
survived by any child or children, the wives should inherit the respective houses 
they occupied together with their contents or a usufruct thereof in cases where it is 
impracticable for them to get ownership.
b) where the deceased is survived by children, in addition to the houses and household 
goods, a third of the net value of the estate should be set aside for the surviving 
spouses to share among themselves in the proportions specified. The difficulty, though, 
lies in whether the third referred to is a third of the net estate prior to taking out the 
household goods and effects or it is a third of the balance after removing the value of 
the houses and household goods. One interpretation would be that the wives share 
among themselves one third of the remainder of the net estate after the value of the 
house or houses and household goods have been removed. However, such an 
interpretation would do extreme violence to the language used, since paragraph (b) 
clearly speaks of "one-third of the net estate"52 and not one-third of the remainder of 
the net estate. The other interpretation would be that the widows' share is a third of 
the net estate prior to taking out the houses and household goods. Taken literally the 
provision must be taken to mean the latter interpretation. The latter interpretation would 
mean that in some estates, particularly those where the value of the houses and 
household goods constitute a larger proportion of the net value of the estate, the other 
beneficiaries may receive nothing or very little. I will illustrate this point a little later.
c) the remaining balance of the estate, after the wives have taken the houses they lived 
in, the household goods therein and their guaranteed one third, should then be shared
52 "Net estate" is defined in section 68(1) as the "residue of an estate remaining after the discharge or 
settlement of the claims of creditors". Clearly, a defined term cannot be read in the context of the 
statute to mean the remainder of the estate after taking off the value of the houses and household 
goods.
Z imbabwe L aw R eview 17
equally among the deceased's children in terms of subparagraph (ii) of paragraph 
(b). As already observed, if my preferred interpretation of the provisions outlined in 
paragraph (b) above is correct, the surviving children may infact receive nothing as 
there may be no remainder after the wives have received the guaranteed houses and 
household goods together with one-third of the net estate, if the term net estate is 
given its defined meaning.
For example, imagine a situation where the deceased owned two houses both valued at 
$300 000,00 and each occupied by one of his two widows. In each of the houses there are 
household goods worth $60 000,00. The deceased had $60 000,00 cash at the bank and also 
owned an undeveloped plot worth $120 000,00. In this example, the wives would receive 
the houses and their contents which together are valued at $720 000,00. In addition, they 
will share among themselves one-third of the net estate which is one-third of $900 000,00 
which equals $300 000,00. But then the remaining balance of the estate after taking out 
$720 000,00 is $180 000,00 which means the wives would share this amount which is already 
less than the one-third share they are entitled to. The children would then receive nothing. 
Only in those estates in which the value of the houses and household goods constitute a 
relatively modesLshare of the net estate would the children be able to participate. For 
example, where the value of houses and household goods is $250 000,00 while the rest of 
the property is say $200 000,00 the children would share the $45 000,00 not going to the 
wives.
However, in many respects, even this interpretation I have preferred seems strenuous and 
even far fetched. The alternative interpretation though, is more far fetched and would do 
extreme violence to the language used as it would give the words "net estate" a meaning 
which is contrary to the definition given. If this alternative meaning is to be preferred, in 
the first example given above, the widows would receive the houses and household goods 
valued at a total of $720 000,00 and then share among themselves in the proportions specified 
one third of the balance of $180 000,00 which is $60 000,00. The senior widow will receive 
two thirds of $60 000,00 which is $40 000,00. The children will then share among themselves 
the balance of $120 000,00. This is obviously neater and more logical, but it is not supported 
by the language of the statute.
It is clear that paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 68F(2) need to be rethought and redrafted 
to achieve clarity and greater sense. A simpler way of doing it would be to grant the 
surviving wives the houses they occupied together with the household goods. Thereafter, 
the remainder of the estate should be shared among the spouses and children in such a 
way that the senior wife receives two shares and the other wife or wives and children each 
receive a share, subject to minimum amounts for the senior wife and the other wife or 
wives, which amounts would be designated by statutory instrument.
The intention of the Legislature is to grant the senior wife a greater share of the one-third 
of the estate than the junior wife or wives and hence the instruction that she should receive 
two shares compared to the single share of the other wife or wives.
MAINTENANCE FROM DECEASED ESTATES
The new inheritance rules to govern customary estates would still be subject to any claims 
and adjustments that might be sought and granted under the provisions of the Deceased 
Persons Family Maintenance Act [Chapter 6:03] which statute gives certain categories of a 
deceased person's dependents the right to claim maintenance from the estate. Such 
maintenance when awarded becomes a prior ranking charge on the estate as against the
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inheritance rights of the heirs, be they testate or intestate heirs53 and hence must be paid 
first or provision for its payment must be secured prior to the distribution of the estate. For 
the avoidance of doubt the Administration of Estates Amendment Act specifically states 
that its provisions "shall not be construed as limiting the right of any person to apply for, 
receive or enjoy any benefit under the Deceased Persons Family Maintenance Act."54
While the Deceased Persons Family Maintenance Act defined the dependents who were 
entitled to claim maintenance from a deceased estate to mean the deceased person's 
surviving spouse or spouses; a divorced spouse of the deceased receiving maintenance in 
terms of a court order; a minor child of the deceased; a disabled child of the deceased 
incapable of maintaining himself or herself and who was being maintained by the deceased 
at the time of his death; and any of the parents of the deceased who were being maintained 
by the deceased at the time of his death, the Administration of Estates Amendment Act 
extends the categories of dependents by adding a new paragraph (f) to the definition of 
dependant which reads:
(f) any other person who —
(i) was being maintained by the deceased at the time of his death; or
(ii) was entitled to the payment of maintenance by the deceased at the time 
of his death.
This broadening of the definition of those who can claim maintenance from a deceased 
estate means that other relatives, such as sisters, brothers, cousins and the like who were 
being maintained by the deceased during his lifetime are now entitled to claim maintenance. 
Even those who were not being maintained by the deceased during his/her lifetime but 
were entitled to be maintained in the sense that the deceased had an obligation to maintain 
them, such as grandparents, would be entitled to seek and be awarded maintenance under 
the new and more liberal definition of dependant.
The old definition excluded a major child, even if he was being maintained by the deceased 
during his/her lifetime.55 Now a major child who was being maintained by the deceased 
will clearly be entitled to claim, so will a major child who was not being maintained but 
towards whom the deceased had a maintenance obligation, such as a major child attending 
an educational institution or one who is simply unemployed and is without the necessary 
means to support himself or herself.
The advisability of this extended definition is doubtful considering that an award of 
maintenance always diminishes or reduces the entitlement of the primary heirs, such as a 
surviving spouse and minor children, to the property in the estate since the maintenance 
award has to be paid first.56
One particularly pervasive problem that has bedeviled African deceased estates in 
Zimbabwe is the practice of relatives of the deceased, particularly those of husbands, of
53 For a fuller discussion of the provisions of this statute and how they operate see J. Stewart, 'The 
Dependents Live On: Protection of Deceased Estates and Maintenance Claims Against Deceased 
Estates" Zimbabwe Law Review 1989-90, Vols. 7-8,104.
54 See section 68K of the Administration of Estates Act as inserted or introduced by section 3 of the 
Administration of Estates Amendment Act.
55 In estates governed by the common law a major dependent child could always claim and be awarded 
maintenance. See, for example, Hoffman v lierdan N.O. and Another 1982(2) SA 274 (TPD) and J. Stewart, 
note 53 above at pp 107-108.
56 Note, however, that the broadening of the definition seems to be an adoption of J. Stewart's argument 
to that effect in J. Stewart, note 53 above at p. 112.
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raiding the deceased's home and either evicting the widow and her children and installing 
themselves in the home or looting and removing the movable property.57
Such conduct, as J. Stewart observes can be "severely prejudicial to the integrity of the 
estate and can lead to the widow and the children of a deceased male being left without 
the necessary means of support, that they are entitled to expect from the estate."58 To remedy 
this situation and discourage the practice of looting estates by relatives of deceased persons 
section 10 of the Deceased Persons Family Maintenance Act seeks to protect the integrity 
of an estate and to ensure the widow and her children continued support from the estate 
by granting them, notwithstanding anything contained in any law including customary 
law, the right to occupy the deceased's immovable property they were occupying before 
the deceased's death; the right to use any household goods and effects, implements, tools, 
vehicles, etc which they were using during the deceased's lifetime; the right to use and 
employ any animals which they used during the deceased's lifetime; and the right to any 
crops which immediately before the death of the deceased were growing or being produced 
on the immovable property to the extent that such use is reasonably necessary for the 
support of the surviving spouse and children.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the reform of marriage and inheritance laws has not only been problematic 
and complicated but has also been controversial. The attempt to cling to some aspects of 
customary law and tradition while embracing and developing more modern ways of 
regulating marriage and inheritance rights has resulted in a muddle of complexities at the 
intersections of custom and tradition on the one hand and new and more modern notions 
of equality and fairness within the family as embodied in general law principles. It certainly 
has not been easy to find a consistent, balanced, logical and equitable mean between the 
two systems. The result is that some half-hearted reforms have appeared to be derailed in 
the quicksands of tradition. What is more, the way forward has remained hazy and often 
appeared slippery. No doubt, debate and reconsideration will continue and more reforms 
will come, being born out of the experiences of the present ones, which will undoubtedly 
cause numerous problems in their application due to their inherent weaknesses, and, in 
some cases, confusion as demonstrated above. However, a starting point has been made in 
eroding and moving away from the clearly unsatisfactory and inequitable customary laws 
of inheritance as reflected in the courts' version of customary law.
57 The former is precisely what had happened in the case of Antonio v Antonio 1991 (2) ZLR 42.
58 ]. Stewart, note 53 above at p. 122.
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